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ALL TOGETHER NOW: THE FAMILY OF MARKS
DOCTRINE IN THE ERA OF APPLE, INC.
Austin Berger*

ABSTRACT
While a significant doctrine within common law trademark, the family
of marks doctrine has not been utilized by as many dominant corporations
within the fifty years since its creation as one might expect. This may be because
the doctrine and its analysis remains rather opaque with little substantive legal
research devoted to its history and framework and with a pastiche of case law
that, on first blush, fails to signal a clear, uniform approach among the circuits.
The doctrine itself, however, has been a deft tool in the hands of certain
corporations who have used it to protect the prized goodwill created in their
respective corporate trademarks. McDonald’s Corp. successfully used the
doctrine to ward off use of the “Mc” prefix in a number of commercial
scenarios, including those involving the sale of food products or restaurants and
those that did not. The doctrine appeared uniquely crafted to serve such high
profile corporations, whose corporate trademark transcended markets and
product lines. Fast-forward twenty years from the era of the Big Mac to the era
of the iPhone. The value of the protection of the family mark remains relevant
whether the product is a hamburger or highly complex electronic equipment. Its
value is in the protection of the trademark providence of the brand. This is
especially reflected in the virtually unlimited creative opportunities Apple, Inc.
(Apple) promises as seen from its innovations in several consumer electronics
marketsthe mp3 player, the cellular phone, the lap-top and personal
computers, and online licensing of music copyrights. In this Article, I seek to
clarify the proper analysis framing issues involving the family of marks doctrine
by tracing its history up to the seminal case of McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s,
Inc., in which McDonald’s right to use the “Mc” mark was respected against a
nascent yet oblique competitor. I finally contend that, after clarifying the
analysis, the doctrine will be useful to Apple, as it was to McDonald’s, to further
command the direction of its brand by eliminating competing uses that directly
or indirectly seek to usurp Apple’s goodwill.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years Apple, Inc. (Apple) has taken significant steps
to develop the strength of its brand through the creation and integration of many
related products. One important way it has furthered its brand mythos has been
through marketing under a common trademark style. By consistently using the
“i” prefix, Apple has developed consumer recognition in a sizeable group of
technological goods and an association between the unifying “i” prefix and
Apple’s overall market success. However, Apple was not the first technology
company to use the “i” prefix.1 Apple did not even originally own the rights to
use the “iPhone” trademark when it began producing its smartphone.2 Even
though it had arguably already acquired rights to trademarks bearing the “i”
prefix, including “iMac,” “iPod,” and “iTunes,” two companiesInfoGear, Inc.
(InfoGear) and Cisco Systems, Inc. (Cisco)acquired rights to the “iPhone”
trademark before Apple.3 Undaunted by Cisco’s apparent prior ownership of the
“iPhone” trademark at the development stage of Apple’s smartphone, Apple
consciously subjected itself to potential trademark infringement liability by
using the mark. Why would Apple willingly take on the risk of such costly
litigation? The story of Apple’s settlement with Cisco and ultimate acquisition
of the “iPhone” trademark helps to highlight Apple’s relentless protection of its
“i” family of trademarks and demonstrates how Apple’s market position will
enable it to effectively use the family of marks doctrine today.
On January 9, 2007, Apple introduced the iPhone amid much speculation
and excitement.4 Building off of Apple’s success with the iPod media player,
Steve Jobs emphasized the importance of the new smart phone within the
technology market of the day: “[T]oday, we’re introducing three revolutionary
products . . . a widescreen iPod . . . a revolutionary mobile phone . . . and a
breakthrough communications device . . . . These are not three separate devices,

1
See John E. Bredehoft, Has the i- Prefix Jumped the Shark?, EMPOPRISE-BI (Jan.
26, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://empoprise-bi.blogspot.com/2010/01/has-i-prefix-jumpedshark.html (Oracle’s 8i Database); see also Ed Burnette, Cisco Lost Rights to iPhone
Trademark Last Year, Experts Say, ZDNET (Jan. 12, 2007, 4:35 PM),
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/burnette/cisco-lost-rights-to-iphone-trademark-last-yearexperts-say/236 (Cisco’s use of the i-Phone trademark).
2
See Burnette, supra note 1.
3
See Steven Musil, Apple, Cisco Settle iPhone Trademark Lawsuit, CNET (Feb. 21,
2007, 6:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/apple,-cisco-settle-iphone-trademark-lawsuit/21001041_3-6161233.html.
4
Tammy W. Cowart & Wade M. Chumey, I Phone, You Phone, We All Phone with
iPhone: Trademark Law and Ethics from an International and Domestic Perspective, 28
J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 331, 331 (2011).

No. 1]

All Together Now: The Family of Marks
Doctrine in the Era of Apple, Inc.

215

this is one device, and we are calling it iPhone.”5 While the iPhone system was
indeed revolutionary, Jobs’ choice of names was not.6 A company called
InfoGear had previously registered the iPhone trademark in 1996 and began
selling its iPhone in 1997.7 Cisco bought InfoGear and its trademark in 2000,
and both InfoGear and Cisco used the trademark prior to Apple to market
phones offering access to computer networks.8
Before unveiling the iPhone, Apple talked to Cisco about purchasing the
trademark, but when those talks failed Apple sought alternative methods.9 Apple
created a limited liability company (LLC) called Ocean Telecom Services
located offshore in the Bahamas for the purpose of filing an intent to use the
mark with the USPTO.10 Ocean Telecom Services claimed a prior right to the
mark based in international law.11 By using an offshore LLC, Apple could obtain
a priority filing under the Madrid Protocol, which allows a trademark holder in
another country to file an international registration with the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO).12 The owner then files for an extension for
protection with the USPTO.13 If the date of international registration is not later
than six months after the date of the first regular national filing in the United
States, the international registrant obtains the same rights to validity as if the
owner filed an initial registration with the USPTO. 14 To successfully use Ocean
Telecom Services’ international registration, Apple would have claimed that
because Cisco had not renewed its registration within the time limit set by the
USPTO, Cisco’s ownership of the mark lapsed, and Apple’s international
registration was entitled to priority. However, Apple never had to make that
argument.
On January 10, 2007, Cisco filed suit against Apple claiming Apple
infringed its “iPhone” trademark.15 In the press concerning the litigation, it was
5

Steve Jobs, Complete Transcript of Steve Jobs, Macworld Conference and Expo
(Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://www.iphonebuzz.com/complete-transcript-of-stevejobs-macworld-conference-and-expo-january-9-2007-23447.php.
6
Company Overview of InfoGear Technology Corporation, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private
/snapshot.asp?privcapId=29892 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Company
Overview].
7
Id.; IPHONE, Registration No. 2,293,011.
8
Company Overview, supra note 7.
9
Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5 at 331–32.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Complaint for Trademark Infringement, Unfair Competition, False Description, and
Injury to Business Reputation and Demand for Jury Trial, Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Apple,
Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00198-MHP, 2007 WL 118953 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2007).
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rumored that negotiations toward settlement initially stalled because Cisco
wanted Apple to make its smart phone compatible with Cisco’s products. 16
Roughly one month after Cisco’s filing, the parties settled the lawsuit.17 In view
of the tremendous success achieved with products such as iMac, iPhoto, iPod,
and iTunes, though, could Apple have made a successful defense? Apple had
spent over eight years and hundreds of millions of dollars developing and
extending the success of its “i” mark before the litigation, consumers anticipated
the unveiling of Apple’s smart phone, and the market assumed that Apple’s
phone would be the “iPhone.”18 Although Cisco had bought the first registration,
it had not developed the amount of consumer recognition Apple had at the time
of Jobs’ unveiling. At that time, Apple’s market success was undeniable. Had
Apple been more aggressive in the litigation, was it clear that Cisco’s blanket
claim of priority would solidify its legal ownership of the “i” prefix?
InfoGear and then Cisco first used the “iPhone” trademark roughly one
year before Apple even began using the “i” prefix with the iMac.19 If Apple had
pursued litigation with Cisco there was a real chance that Cisco could have
asserted a prior right to the mark notwithstanding Apple’s consumer recognition
or the argument that Cisco had abandoned the mark.20 By owning the first filing,
Cisco was entitled to assert a rebuttable presumption of prior ownership.21 If
Cisco were successful, and obtained a permanent injunction against Apple, one
of Apple’s key products would not have been as both Apple intended and the
consumer electronics market expected. Apple would also have been inhibited
from extending its successful line of “i” products in the cell phone market.
Apple did have arguments of its own had the litigation progressed, but
their success remained speculative in light of Cisco’s prior registration.22 Apple
could have argued that its phone was materially different from Cisco’s and that,
therefore, it did not pose a likelihood of confusion.23 An important fact
bolstering this argument was that Cisco’s phone was designed for a dial-up
internet connection, while Apple’s phone used wireless technology.24 Apple
16

Victoria Shannon, Cisco Systems’ Chief Executive Calls Apple Lawsuit a ‘Minor
Skirmish’,
INT’L
HERALD
TRIB.
(Jan.
27,
2007),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/25/technology/25iht-cisco.4338311.html?_r=0.
17
Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5, at 331–33.
18
Id.
19
Apple Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc (last visited Nov.
20, 2013).
20
Tom Krazit, How Apple Could Fight Cisco, CNET (January 12, 2007, 4:01 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1041_3-6149755.html (“[N]o matter what [Apple] does, it is
treading uphill because Cisco has a registered trademark with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office . . . .”).
21
Id.
22
See Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5.
23
Id. (“[Apple is] the first company ever to use iPhone for a cell phone.”).
24
Id.
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could have also argued that Cisco abandoned its iPhone mark because Cisco
bought the mark in 2000 and did not use it until 2006 (under 15 U.S.C. § 1127,
three years of consecutive non-use is prima facie evidence of having abandoned
the trademark).25 Finally, Apple could have attempted to assert a family of
marks argument, arguing that, because Cisco abandoned the prior registration,
Apple’s creation of subsequent consumer recognition should be respected. 26 In
2006, when Cisco challenged Apple, Apple marketed at least six products under
the “i” prefix and had developed significant consumer recognition. Ultimately,
Apple sought to protect its investment and its “i” family mark through the
security of settlement. Through Apple’s quick legal maneuvering it obtained
rights to use the iPhone mark, ensured what would eventually be a substantial
segment of its current market share, and further unified its product base.
Commentators have noted that when consumers see the lowercase “i”
they expect to see an Apple product and “all that goes with it.”27 Apple has
continually broadened the scope of its “i” family, thereby pushing the
boundaries over which its market influence reaches. The strides Apple has made
in its business growth can be seen in the relatively short amount of time it has
taken to expand from being primarily a producer of personal computers to
becoming a computer, media player, cell phone, and internet commerce
powerhouse, with the capability for additional growth in the future.28 Within a
family of marks discussion, Apple’s growth creates interesting questions for
determining exactly how broad Apple’s influence, consumer recognition, and
corresponding protection should extend.
Part I of this Comment provides an in-depth discussion of the history of
the family of marks doctrine arising from the Lanham Act of 1946. In detailing
the case law that has shaped the doctrine, this Part also offers the issues that
frame the appropriate analysis surrounding it. Part I traces the common law
growth of the doctrine from an unapplied idea to a working grounds for
summary judgment. Part II of this Comment synthesizes the analysis drawn
from Part I, with heavy influence from the Southern District of New York’s
decision in McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., as a starting point from which
to address how the doctrine may benefit Apple today. Part II concludes with
three hypotheticals, which aim to clarify how Apple might use the doctrine
through possible fact patterns. I conclude, by applying the doctrine to these
hypotheticals, that Apple will likely succeed in a family of marks argument
25

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (three years of consecutive non-use is prima facie
evidence of having abandoned the trademark); see also Cowart & Chumey, supra note 5,
at 331–55.
26
See Krazit, supra note 21.
27
Michael J. Zussman, Taking a Bite from the Proverbial Apple: Intellectual
Property for Attorneys and Entrepreneurs, 59-FEB. FED. LAW. 16, 17 (2012).
28
Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc (last visited Nov.
20, 2013).
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where the offending trademark occurs in a related market to the consumer
electronics market Apple so clearly dominates. Part II also raises concerns for
Apple if it fails to actively police its “i” family mark by addressing the
possibility that third party use may become so prevalent that a court could find it
has become the generic property of all technology or internet-based companies.

I. HISTORY OF THE FAMILY OF MARKS DOCTRINE
Section 1052 of the Lanham Act, the primary federal trademark statute
within the United States Code, deals principally with the registration of
trademarks.29 Within this section, sub-section (d) states:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal
register on account of its nature unless it . . . [c]onsists of or comprises a
mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive . . . .30

The family of marks doctrine is a common law extension of the law prohibiting
registration of marks or trade names that are likely to cause confusion, mistake,
or deception with a pre-existing mark or trade name.31 Instead of prohibiting a
name that is confusingly similar to an existing mark, the doctrine prohibits a
name that is confusingly similar to a pre-existing group of marks, from which
the owner of the group derives market utility because the market recognizes the
collective uniqueness of the group.32
A. Early Cases
Initially the family of marks doctrine was solely a measure of a
proprietary interest in a registered type of mark recurrently used by the
trademark owner.33 In Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Mezger Pharmcal Co., the
plaintiff appealed the Examiner of Interference’s dismissal of an opposition to
the defendant’s application to register “Lipofax.”34 The plaintiff owned
29

15 U.S.C. § 1052; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent
Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress, 75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 474 (1997) (“The
Lanham Act provides protection . . . for words, symbols or designs that identify the
source of a product—that are, in trademark parlance, ‘distinctive.’”).
30
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).
31
Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 58–59 (9th Cir. 1962).
32
Id.
33
Burroughs Wellcome & Co. v. Mezger Pharmacal Co., 228 F.2d 243, 243–44
(C.C.P.A. 1955).
34
Id. at 243.
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numerous marks that ended in the syllable “fax” and recurrently used the suffix
to identify its products.35 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)
determined that the plaintiff did not own a proprietary interest in the syllable
because, not only was it the final syllable of common words, but a number of
third parties had registered trademarks for similar products.36 The court in
Burroughs suggested that if the plaintiff did not own a proprietary interest in the
syllable “fax,” then the plaintiff’s case depended solely on whether consumers
were likely to mistake any of their individual registrations for the defendant’s
trademark.37
Eventually courts began to use the doctrine not only to determine whether
the proponent owned the family mark, but also to determine whether the
subsequent mark presented a likelihood of confusion.38 In Lauritzen & Co. v.
Borden Co., Borden opposed the registration of the trademark “Fortilac” based
on its prior registrations of “Protolac,” “Breadlac,” “Starlac,” “Parlac,”
“Akrelac,” and “Biolac.”39 Borden claimed its registered marks constituted a
family of marks ending in “lac” and that the public would assume any new mark
with that suffix would be its product.40 The court rejected this argument because
“lac” is the Latin word for milk and all of the plaintiff’s marks applied to milk
products. Because the court considered the Latin meaning ubiquitous, it
considered “lac” dangerously close to being a generic mark, which precluded
Borden from asserting distinctive ownership over it.41 Lauritzen also showed
that there were at least five existing third party registrations of trademarks with
the “lac” suffix.42 For these reasons, the court determined that Borden’s prior
registrations had to be considered individually instead of constituting a family.43
In the early 1960s, the CCPA set early difficult precedents for companies
attempting to make family of marks arguments.44 The two Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp. cases reveal the court’s struggle to accept the doctrine’s very
validity. 45 Where the court did discuss the doctrine, its early approach seemed to
suggest a policy in favor of permitting registration of arguably similar marks in
the absence of evidence demonstrating actual consumer confusion.46
35

Id. at 244.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Lauritzen & Co. v. Borden Co., 239 F.2d 405, 406–07 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
39
Id. at 406.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 407.
42
Id. at 406.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Winter Seal Corp., 291 F.2d 945
(C.C.P.A. 1961); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Jones Eng’g Co., 292 F.2d 294
(C.C.P.A. 1961).
45
Winter Seal, 291 F.2d 945; Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d 294.
46
Winter Seal, 291 F.2d at 946; Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d at 296.
36
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In the first of these cases, Jones & Laughlin opposed the registration of
Winter Seal’s “Jal-Master” mark, arguing that it was confusingly similar to its
family of “jal” marks, which included “Jalcase,” “Jalloy,” “Jal-Duct,” “Jal-Dor,”
“Jalten,” and “Jal-Zinc.”47 The court held that because the defendant’s goods
were so different from the plaintiff’s, actual consumer confusion was unlikely. 48
In the second case, which also occurred in July 1961, Jones & Laughlin brought
action to bar registration of Jones Engineering Company’s “Jal-O-Vent” mark.49
The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s use, arguing that consumers were likely to
confuse it with the plaintiff’s family of “jal” products.50 In support of this
argument, the plaintiff offered the testimony of several members of the
construction industry who stated that on encountering the defendant’s mark they
would have believed it was one of the plaintiff’s. 51
In the first case, Jones & Laughlin failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
confusion, in part, because it did not present any evidence demonstrating actual
confusion. It sought to remedy this in the second case through the construction
industry members’ statements.52 In weighing this evidence, however, the court
found the witnesses’ statements did not offer any particular instances of actual
confusion.53 It decided that their statements were hypothetical because they were
based on what the construction industry members would have thought had they
experienced the opposed’s trademark.54 The court stated that such speculative
statements could not support instances of actual confusion because they were
merely opinions.55 The court went on to say that the obvious differences in the
sound, spelling, pronunciation, and meaning were “such to obviate any
likelihood of confusion.”56 The only commonality was the “jal” prefix, which
was clearly suggestive of the jalousie-type of doors on which the underlying
products were used. 57 The court held in the earlier Jones & Laughlin Steel case
that the more a name suggests the nature of a good, the weaker its trademark
strength.58 In the second case, the court utilized this analysis, citing its earlier
finding that where “Jal” is coupled with “Dor” (a misspelling of “door”) the
suggestive nature of both words weakens the overall strength of the mark.59 The
47

Winter Seal, 291 F.2d at 946.
Id.
49
Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 295.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 296.
57
Id. at 295.
58
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Winter Seal Corp., 291 F.2d 945, 946 (C.C.P.A.
1961).
59
Jones Eng’g, 292 F.2d at 295.
48
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court held the overall suggestive nature of “jal” precluded Jones & Laughlin
from having a protectable family mark.60
B. Validation of the Theory
While the early cases seemed to be in agreement that there was such a
thing called the family of marks doctrine, none of these courts had actually
enforced it in real life. The doctrine seemed at risk of disappearing into disuse.
This sentiment is clearly indicated by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Creamette
Co. v. Merlino.61 In Creamette, the plaintiff argued the defendant’s use of the
unregistered mark “Majorette” to sell macaroni products infringed its registered
trademark “Creamettes.”62 The court held that the plaintiff did not have an
“indisputable right” to the exclusive use of the suffix “ette” because the suffix
was so widely used to form a diminutive of common words.63 In fact, because
use of the suffix for a variety of products was so pervasive, and because it was
capable of being used in “an infinite variety of wholly dissimilar words,” the
court doubted whether it could ever establish a family mark.64
The court even went so far as to doubt the existence of the doctrine itself:
“[s]ome cases squint at the possibility of acquiring rights in a ‘family’ of marks,
but none has upheld such a claim under circumstances even remotely resembling
those of this case.”65 Additionally, the court stated that the plaintiff’s actual use
of marks within the family, such as “Juniorettes” and “Spagh-Ettes” along with
the more popular “Creamettes,” was so minimal and recent that the marks could
not have achieved significant consumer recognition.66 The court’s holding
demonstrated that the market dominance of a family was an important factor in
determining the protection of the family; it also suggested that the use of certain
marks, such as the “ettes” suffix, was so pervasive both in the culture and in the

60

Id. at 296.
Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Spraying Sys. Co.
v. Delvan Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 395 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding the suffix “jet” for spray
nozzles is descriptive and not supporting of a family of marks argument, even though
there was evidence of substantial sales and market share); Am. Standard Inc. v. Scott &
Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 457, 461 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (holding the prefix “aqua”
was highly suggestive for water faucets and thus could not serve as a distinctive feature
of a family of marks); Servo Corp. of Am. v. Servo-Tex Prods. Co., 289 F.2d 955, 956
(C.C.P.A. 1961) (holding the prefix “servo” is commonly used in the industry as an
abbreviation for certain products (servomotors and servomechanisms) and is, therefore,
descriptive and cannot distinguish a family of marks).
62
Creamette. 299 F.2d at 56.
63
Id. at 58.
64
Id. at 59.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 58.
61
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market that enforcing them as a family mark under § 1052(d) would be
impossible.67
While circuit courts, such as the Ninth Circuit in Creamette, threatened to
marginalize and cast doubt on the family of marks doctrine as a valid legal
theory, the 1963 decision of the CCPA in Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths went far to
redeem it.68 In Motorola, the plaintiff argued it had established a pattern of use
of “Golden” in the radio and television electronics industries prior to the
defendant’s proposed mark, “The Golden Grid,” for TV remotes. 69 The plaintiff
made four successful arguments in suggesting the defendant’s new trademark
would infringe its prior use.70 First, the plaintiff argued that its business in the
radio and television electronics field had been substantial.71 The plaintiff showed
that its ninety-eight distributors sold to 23,000 retailers and 25,000 service and
repair organizations. Second, the plaintiff argued that the value of products sold
in connection with one or more of its family trademarks was greatthe value of
the products was in excess of $230 million, with $12 million spent on
advertising.72 Additionally, the value of replacement parts and components
bearing the relevant marks was $3 million per year.73 Third, the plaintiff argued
the period of time over which it sold and marketed its trademarks, prior to the
defendant’s entry, was substantial: twenty-two years, from 1935–1957.74 And
finally, plaintiff argued that by the time of the defendant’s first use, the plaintiff
had already been established in the television receiver industry with several
“Golden” trademarks.75 The court held, “[w]hether or not the situation is
categorized as one in which the opposer has a ‘family,’” it was likely that at
least a substantial number of consumers would attribute origin of the
defendant’s mark to the plaintiff.76 The court noted that part of the defendant’s
mark was descriptive (“Grid”).77 However, it also stated that the issue was not
whether part of the plaintiff’s marks was descriptive, but whether the
defendant’s mark was likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as a
whole.78 The court also noted that there were ten third party registrations that
used “Golden” in the electronics field, five of which were pertinent.79
Significantly, and in direct opposition to the prior case law finding concurrent
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs. Inc., 317 F.2d 397, 401 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
Id. at 399.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id.
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third party registrations as a significant factor against the existence of a family
mark, the court stated: “As a matter of logic it would seem to us that if opposer
has a family of six marks all starting with the non-descriptive word “Golden,” it
still has that family notwithstanding there may be some others using the same
word to some undisclosed extent.”80 The court’s holdings that (1) the existence
of a family mark is consistent with the existence of concurrent third party
registrations, and (2) the amount, value, volume, and duration of the family
owner’s business at the time of the defendant’s entry are important factors in
proving ownership of a family were both significant steps toward the
development of the family of marks doctrine.
Two years later, the CCPA reconsidered the doctrine in Polaroid Corp. v.
Richard Mfg. Co.81 Polaroid argued that its use of the prefix “pola” on a wide
variety of photographic products had created such public recognition of the
prefix that its trademarks were entitled to family protection.82 The court signaled
a retraction from its position in Motorola by clearly addressing Polaroid’s
argument and dismissing it:
We agree with the board that the evidence fails to establish that appellant
has advertised or promoted such marks sufficiently to establish in the mind
of the public or in the trade a recognition or awareness that it possesses a
‘family of marks’ identified by the prefix ‘pola’ and that the ownership
and registration of a number of marks containing this prefix is not
sufficient to create that exclusivity claimed for the prefix ‘pola,’ per se,
under the theory advanced.83

Mere registrations of marks with the common element alone would not support a
family of marks claim.84 The court emphasized that each case, under a theory of
likelihood of confusion, must be decided on the facts before the court.85 In
comparing the defendant’s mark “Poly-vue” with the plaintiff’s marks, including
“Polacolor,” “Pola-line,” “Polapak,” and “Polachrome,” the court held that the
striking and distinguishing dissimilarities between the marks prevented any real
likelihood of confusion.86 They did not look alike to the court, their
pronunciations were different, and each mark imparted separate and distinct
connotations.87
As the case law further developed, the CCPA adopted a more
standardized approach to family of marks claims.88 In Procter & Gamble Co. v.
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Polaroid Corp. v. Richard Mfg. Co., 341 F.2d 150 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Cohen, 375 F.2d 494 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
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Cohen, the Court established preliminary considerations that must be satisfied to
apply the doctrine: (1) whether each party to the lawsuit actually owns its marks;
(2) whether the party asserting the doctrine can actually show priority of use;
and (3) whether the goods used under each mark are “identical in kind.”89 The
court went on to hold that Procter & Gamble failed to establish proof that their
courtesy title marks “Mr.,” “Mrs.,” or “Lady,” in conjunction with words or
signs having cleaning significance, established family protection.90 The court
addressed the defendant’s “Mr. Sani-Terry” mark as a whole, including both the
mark’s name and personified design, which the court considered a vital part of
the defendant’s mark.91 The court found the design, spelling, and sound of the
mark distinct enough from the “Mr. Clean” mark that no likelihood of confusion
was present.92
C. Family of Marks in Conjunction with Secondary Meaning and Inherent
Distinctiveness
In his Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc. opinion of 1976,
Judge Friendly created a legal framework for what earlier trademark cases called
inherent distinctiveness, providing an important addition to the family marks
analysis. 93 In Abercrombie, he detailed the spectrum of protectable trademarks
and stated that a trademark’s registration with the Patent Office afforded a
rebuttable presumption that the mark is suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful and,
therefore, sufficiently distinctive to support protection.94 The spectrum of
trademarks runs from the arbitrary and fanciful, to the suggestive, the
descriptive, and ultimately the generic, with the first categories being the most
protectable and the latter categories being the least protectable.95 Distinctiveness
89

Id. at 496.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. (court doesn’t actually rule on the spelling or the sound).
93
See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir.
1976); see also Dinwoodie, supra note 30, at 482. (“The primary prerequisite to
trademark protection is proof of a mark’s distinctiveness.”).
94
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11.
95
See id. Fanciful or arbitrary trademarks are those “invented solely for their use as
trademarks,” and are the most inherently distinctive trademarks. Id. at n.12. A suggestive
trademark is less inherently distinctive, but is still entitled to registration without proof of
secondary meaning. A trademark is suggestive if it requires “imagination, thought and
perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of goods.” Id. at 11. A trademark is
descriptive if it “conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients, qualities or characteristics
of the goods,” and may not be protected unless the owner can demonstrate secondary
meaning in the mark. Id. And finally, generic trademarks are not protectable because they
offer no distinction between the type of good marketed and the proponent’s product; they
are those that “[refer], or [have] come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which
the particular product is a species.” Id. at 9.
90
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also became important within the context of determining the strength of the
proponent’s trademark under a likelihood of confusion analysis.96
Also in the 1970s, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the distinctiveness of the
proponent’s family mark in terms of whether the mark had acquired secondary
meaning.97 In Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., the Fifth Circuit addressed
the likelihood that Milsan’s aloe products would be confused with Aloe Crème’s
family of aloe trademarks, after the latter argued it had established secondary
meaning in the word “alo.”98 In Milsan, the court noted that the Fifth Circuit had
adopted a policy of not recognizing secondary meaning in a trademark that
comprises the common name of a good, because “the recognition of property
rights in the common name of an article could be tantamount to granting a
monopoly in that commodity.”99 The Seventh Circuit expanded that prohibition
to marks that are generic names of an ingredient of the underlying product, but
the Fifth Circuit declined to adopt this expansive view.100 It instead addressed
whether “alo” had gained secondary meaning under Aloe Crème’s promotion
and marketing.101 The court stated that the evidentiary burden necessary to
establish secondary meaning is substantial where the mark designates a principal
ingredient of a product desired by the public.102 To provide evidence of
secondary meaning, the court stated that the proponent must demonstrate that
the public recognized the particular trademark and associated it with the
proponent’s brand.103 It held that Aloe Crème had not met its burden to establish
secondary meaning in its “alo” family of trademarks.104 Although Aloe Crème
had spent almost $3 million in advertising its aloe products in various
96

See Sizes Unlimited, Inc. v. Sizes to Fit, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1558, 1561 (E.D.N.Y.
1994).
97
Aloe Crème Labs, Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 850 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming
the district court’s finding that “alo” was descriptive and that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated secondary meaning in the mark).
98
Id. at 848–50. Secondary meaning occurs when a company turns a word or term
that is descriptive of an important aspect of the underlying product into a word the public
closely associates with the company’s trademark. See id. at 848. What originally was
only descriptive, on gaining secondary meaning, turns into a “full-fledged trademark.” Id.
at 848 n.13. The chief inquiry in an analysis of secondary meaning is the attitude of the
consumer toward the mark and whether it denotes a “single thing coming from a single
source.” Id. at 849. Relevant considerations include: proof of long-time use of the
trademark; extensive sales of products under the trademark; and significant advertising or
promotion. Id. at 850.
99
Id. at 849.
100
Id.; see also Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler, Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir.
1965) (“Jujubes”); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg., 343 F.2d 655, 668 (7th
Cir. 1965) (“yo-yos”).
101
Milsan, 423 F.2d at 849–50.
102
Id. at 850.
103
Id.
104
Id.
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publications such as Harpers Bazaar and Vogue, it provided only one witness to
testify about consumer recognition and secondary meaning, and that witness
testified that customers had used the term “alo” to refer to aloe products
generally.105
However, in Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) held that the proponent had established a family of
marks in the prefix “alo,” despite the fact that the prefix was a generic name for
an underlying ingredient.106 The opposer’s long list of “alo” products along with
the extensive use and advertising of those marks provided sufficient evidence
that the mark had acquired secondary meaning. It sold its “alo” products
throughout the United States at leading department and drug stores, with over
3600 active retail accounts.107 It also utilized newspaper advertisements,
cooperative agreements with retailers, special sales promotions and displays,
and spent approximately $5 million dollars on marketing between 1953 and
1975.108 Its total sales were near $21 million.109 Importantly, the Board noted
that the very evidence suggesting the “alo” mark had acquired secondary
meaning through distinctiveness in the marketplace also showed the opposer had
established a family of marks.110
D. Seminal Family of Marks Case: McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc.
In 1986 the Southern District of New York decided McDonald’s Corp. v.
McBagel’s, Inc., one of the most important cases for the family of marks
doctrine.111 McDonald’s Corporation opened its first restaurant in upstate New
York in 1958 and expanded to several hundred across the state over the next
twenty years, brought action to enjoin a company called McBagel’s, Inc. and its

105

Id.
Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316, 1975 TTAB
LEXIS 114, at *33–34 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 1975) (holding the difference in spelling
between “alo” and “aloe” cannot be overlooked in addressing secondary meaning;
extensive advertising and sales over a reasonable time may “condition” the public to
recognize the brand over the descriptive term).
107
Id. at *12–13.
108
Id. at *13.
109
Id. at *15.
110
See id. *31–35.
111
See generally McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
106
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sole shareholder from using its mark in connection with a bagel bakery and
restaurant.112
1. Background of the Case
At the time of the lawsuit, McDonald’s held no trade or service mark
registration for “Mc,” but had registered around thirty-four marks containing
“Mc” or “Mac.”113 In 1984, McBagel’s opened its restaurant in New York,
advertising the restaurant locally on radio stations and billboards.114
McDonald’s’ primary claim in the lawsuit was that McBagel’s infringed its
family of “Mc” products through a confusingly similar use of “Mc” in a related
market.115 The court expressed the doctrine particularly well:
[I]f McDonald’s can demonstrate that it has established a “family of
marks,” the corporation may obtain trademark protection against one
whose mark is thought to emanate from the same source as the plaintiff’s
family. The existence . . . of a family of marks is a question of fact based
on the distinctiveness of the common formative component and other
factors, including the extent of the family’s use, advertising, promotion,
and its inclusion in a number of registered and unregistered marks owned
by a single party.116

2. Court’s Holding and Analysis as to Family of Marks Ownership
The court had “no hesitation” in finding that McDonald’s owned a family
of both registered and unregistered marks in the “Mc” or “Mac” prefix.117 Some
of the factors most persuasive to the court included: (1) the existence of
McDonald’s many mark registrations of the “Mc” or “Mac” prefix for foodrelated products (sixteen listed); (2) the “massive” advertising expenditures
devoted by the company to create recognition for those marks (over one hundred
different TV commercials run nationally and locally between 1975 and 1986,
billboards as well as print advertising in national magazines such as Time,
Newsweek, and Sports Illustrated, and in store promotion at McDonald’s 6,800
U.S. restaurants); (3) the substantial evidence of independent articles in the
media about McDonald’s and its prefix, which suggested public awareness; (4)
112

Id. at 1268. McDonald’s has also actively enforced its “Mc” family mark against
apparent non-competitors. See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. McKinley, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1895, 1896 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (“McTeddy Bears”); J&J Snack Foods Corp. v.
McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“McPretzels”); McDonald’s
Corp. v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1274, 1275 (T.T.A.B. 1995) (“McLegal
Services”).
113
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1270.
114
Id. at 1271.
115
Id. at 1272.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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the length of time McDonald’s had been using its “Mc” family of marks for food
items on their menu (over ten years between 1975 and 1986); and (5) the court
also noted that McDonald’s actively policed its rights in the “Mc” prefix prior to
McBagel’s’ use.118
In discussing whether McBagel’s infringed McDonald’s family mark, the
court stated that McDonald’s need only prove by a preponderance of evidence
that a likelihood of confusion existed.119 A family mark owner satisfies this
burden by showing there is an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent
purchasers who are likely to be misled or confused concerning the origin of the
other party’s mark.120 Confusion may be of any type, including confusion of
source, sponsorship, affiliation, connection, or identification.121 The public need
not actually believe the owner of the family produced the second party’s
product; the public’s belief that the mark owner sponsored or otherwise
approved the use of the second mark is enough to show confusion.122
3. Court’s Holding & Analysis as to Likelihood of Confusion
In addressing whether likelihood of confusion existed, the McDonald’s
Court determined that a court must weigh numerous, non-exclusive factors: (1)
the strength of the owner’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the marks;
(3) the proximity of the products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap by expanding its product line into the market occupied by the
defendant; (5) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant
adopted their mark in good faith; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product; (8)
the sophistication of the buyers; and (9) the relative harm to the parties should
the court grant or deny the relief requested.123 The court found that a clear
majority of the nine factors favored McDonald’s (it did not determine the
relative quality of the goods in question) and concluded “McBagel’s” had
infringed the “Mc” family mark.124

118
Id.; see also Emily Grant, Might Makes McRight: McDonald’s Corporation’s
Trademark Strategy, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 227, 229 (2004).
119
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1273.
120
McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979).
121
Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971);
King Research, Inc. v. Shulton, Inc., 454 F.2d 66, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1972); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979).
122
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 204.
123
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Chandon
Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1964).
124
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274–79.
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a. Strength of the Owner’s Mark
Under the first factor, the court found McDonald’s family mark was
strong.125 The strength of a family mark is a function of its distinctiveness, or its
“tendency to identify the goods or services sold under the mark with a particular
source.”126 Arbitrary marks are stronger than descriptive marks because they are
easily identified solely with the producer of a particular product or service. 127
Examples include “Dial,” “Sanka,” and “Pepsi.’’128 The court found the “Mc”
formative was, standing alone, “arbitrary and fanciful” and described nothing; it
also noted that McDonald’s advertising efforts enhanced its distinctiveness. 129
Additionally, McDonald’s’ successful legal efforts in enforcing the mark gave it
greater strength.130 In important dicta, the court stated that mere third party
registrations of “Mc” by themselves do not weaken the McDonald’s family. 131
For third party registrations to provide evidence of the weakness of the
proponent’s family, the court stated, the defendant would have to demonstrate
“actual use” of third party registrations by competitors, and a high degree to
which such a competitor “promot[ed] . . . their marks through advertising.”132
There was no evidence that third party registrations of “Mc” were actually used
by McDonald’s’ competitors or that consumers identified such marks with a
specific product sponsored by such a competitor.133 The court’s finding with
regard to the strength of McDonald’s family has been echoed in subsequent
cases filed by McDonald’s to enforce its family: “[McDonald’s ‘Mc’ family
mark] rank[s] among the strongest marks, enjoying instant recognition among
virtually all members of our society.”134
b. Degree of Similarity Between the Marks
Under the second factor, the court found that the two marks were
similar.135 The defendant advertised the “McBagel’s” mark prominently in
newspaper and on the radio and did not differentiate its services from

125

Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1274 (citing McGregor, Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131
(2d Cir. 1979)).
127
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 1185, 1197
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d mem., 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980).
128
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
See, e.g., Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 211 (D.
Md. 1988).
135
McDonald’s Corp., 649 F. Supp. at 1275.
126
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McDonald’s’ services.136 The court noted that the advertising mediums used by
the parties, as well as the cross sections of the public reached by that advertising,
were similar.137 Also, differences in trade dress did not dispel any possible
association between the two companies; the court found that the McBagel’s
customer could mistakenly believe that McDonald’s had entered the bagel
market under a slightly different name and style. 138 McDonald’s history of
expansion, as well as the fact that it operates in the same areas within the city
suggested further similarity.139 Differences between McBagel’s’ and
McDonald’s’ trade dress within each respective restaurant were not material to
the extent that the important temporal point of confusion was drawing the
customer to the store through advertising.140 The consumer, once confused, was
more likely to make a purchase at McBagel’s even though its trade dress
differed from McDonald’s.141
c. Proximity of the Products
Thirdly, the court found that the respective products were proximate
because they were marketed in the same industry (restaurant services).142 Both
marks were used to advertise products in the New York fast food business. 143
The fact that the services at each respective restaurant were not precisely the
same (burgers and fries compared with a bagel bakery) was immaterial.144 Even
if the services were found to be different but closely related, the court noted,
McDonald’s would still be entitled to protection.”145 Both the similarity of the
parties’ businesses and McDonald’s’ history of expansion, suggested the
products and services were sufficiently proximate because any consumer could
reasonably believe McDonald’s sponsored McBagel’s.146 Subsequent courts
have held that even where the markets of the respective products are not
136

Id.
Id. (One of the plaintiff’s witnesses testified that the market to which each business
was directed included “anyone with a stomach.”).
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 1276.
143
Id.
144
Id.; see also Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928)
(“[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the
field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a court . . . [i]f another uses it, he
borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his control.”).
145
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1276 (holding trademark owner is entitled to
protection from confusion not only with the specific type of product it markets, but also
with any closely related products that consumers could reasonably believe were produced
or sponsored by the family mark owner).
146
Id.
137
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proximate, McDonald’s could still enforce its family mark where “an
appreciable number of the public [is likely] to be confused by believing [the
opposed’s product] is sponsored, associated, affiliated, connected, or endorsed
by McDonald’s.”147
d. Likelihood of Expansion
Additionally, the court found that based on McDonald’s history and
growth, there was a distinct possibility that McDonald’s would expand its
product line to include bagels.148 Substantial probative evidence established that
McDonald’s had an ongoing program to test new products, and sold bagels
under this program.149
e. Evidence of Actual Consumer Confusion
Under the fifth factor, the court reasoned that, although evidence of actual
confusion is not essential, any evidence of actual confusion is highly persuasive
in proving confusion.150 The court found evidence of “substantial actual
confusion,” based on testimony by a McBagel’s manager suggesting he received
inquiries from customers concerning whether McDonald’s was going into the
bagel business, as well as on the results of two independent national and local
surveys. 151 Nearly one out of four people (24.8%) in the national survey and one
out of three people (36.4%) in the state survey believed that McDonald’s
sponsored McBagel’s.152 The major reason given by the survey participants for
believing in the sponsorship was the use of “Mc” in McBagel’s’ name.153 In
subsequent cases where the products were sold in different markets, the actual

147

Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 221 (holding the
opposed’s trademark “MCSLEEP” used in promoting its motel business was a business
operating outside the food industry, but which infringed McDonald’s family mark under
a likelihood of confusion analysis).
148
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1277.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. Of the respondents, roughly one out of four nationally and one out of three in
NY believed McBagel’s was actually sponsored or promoted by McDonald’s. Id. Six out
of ten persons who had such a belief stated the major reason for that belief was the ‘Mc’
in the name. Id. The court found both the incidents of actual confusion as well as the
survey substantial and probative of the issue of likelihood of confusion. Id.
152
Id.
153
Id. Six out of ten in the national survey and seven out of ten in the state survey gave
this reason. Id.
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confusion was required to be more than insignificant to support a finding of
infringement.154
f. Good Faith
Under the sixth factor, the court determined that the defendants had acted
in less than good faith by adopting the “McBagel’s” mark.155 The court made
this determination after discrediting the defendant’s story of how the mark was
chosen.156 It found the story uncorroborated, implausible, and discredited after
observing the owner of McBagel’s on the witness stand.157 This finding was
further reinforced by the fact that McBagel’s advertised a new food item called
the “Mc (stuffed) Bagel” after McDonald’s had filed its action.158 The court
found McBagel’s had attempted to exploit notoriety from the litigation by
promoting this item and had, therefore, acted in bad faith.159
g. Relative Quality of the Products
Under the seventh factor, the court found that it need not resolve the
question of which company’s product was superior.160 A prior owner should not
be subjected to the risk that the public perception of the product will suffer if
associated with a product of inferior quality; however, this factor was not
essential to the court’s holding.161
h. Sophistication of the Consumers
The court did determine that where buyers are unsophisticated or make
their decisions quickly and casually, the likelihood of confusion increases. 162
The court’s position was that consumers in the fast food market do not make
sophisticated restaurant choices and instead make decisions quickly and casually
(don’t tell this to fans of In-N-Out).163 Based on finding each factor in favor of
McDonald’s and likelihood of confusion (excluding a determination of the

154
McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop At Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810 (M.D. Tenn.
2000) (Even though the potential pool for confused McDonald’s customers was
enormous, the production of sixteen phone calls suggesting actual consumer confusion
“border[ed] on insignificant.”).
155
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1278.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 1279.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
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seventh factor), the court held McBagel’s’ infringement warranted an
injunction.164
i. Balance of Hardships in Consideration of Proper Remedy
The court balanced the relative hardships to the parties and determined
that because McBagel’s had made its business investments subsequent to the
litigation with knowledge that use of the mark might have to be discontinued,
this favored granting McDonald’s an injunction.165 The court framed the
appropriate injunctive relief by prohibiting the defendant from using “Mc”
solely in combination with a “generic food item”; the defendant was free to use
the “Mc” prefix if he chose his full name as his trademark, making his mark
more arbitrary under Judge Friendly’s analysis.166 The court noted that
McDonald’s did not have a “boundless monopoly” over the mark,167 but, instead,
McDonald’s was entitled to rights to the “Mc” family that bore a relation to the
manner in which it was used to promote its business.168
E. Later Cases
As the case law further developed around the strong analysis exemplified
by the Southern District of New York in McDonald’s, courts became more
comfortable granting summary judgment, as well as preliminary and permanent
injunctions predicated on family of marks arguments.169 For example, in Soltex
164

Id.
Id. (“This is not a case where an injunction will unfairly disadvantage a second user
who has expended considerable sums to promote his trademark before the first user
raised the issue of infringement.”).
166
Id. at 1282.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
See Int’l Diagnostic Tech., Inc. v. Miles Labs., Inc., 746 F.2d 798, 800 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (finding a likelihood of confusion where the family mark “STIX” was strikingly
similar to defendant’s “STIQ” in sound, appearance, and connotation; both products were
marketed in the same industry and could be used as complementary tests); E. & J. Gallo
Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding
defendant had infringed plaintiff’s family as a matter of law and plaintiff was entitled to
summary judgment); Sizes Unlimited, Inc. v. Sizes to Fit, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1558, 1567
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding plaintiff had not shown their unregistered “Sizes” family had
acquired secondary meaning and its motion for an injunction was denied); Champagne
Louis Roederer, S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(upholding the lower court’s decision that the dissimilarity of the marks was dispositive
of the issue of likelihood of confusion, even though many of the other factors favored the
plaintiff; one factor alone may be dispositive especially when it is dissimilarity);
Lucasfilm Ltd., v. Media Market Group, Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 897, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(finding that while parody is not a defense against infringement, it is relevant in showing
there is little likelihood of confusion); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-On-Bleu, Inc.,
165
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Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Industries, Inc., the Second Circuit held a district court
has discretion to fashion injunctive relief commensurate with the extent of the
defendant’s infringement.170 Given the fact that the defendant sold its infringing
mark in the raw plastic market and the plaintiff sold its family of marks in
finished plastic, the court reasoned that requiring the defendant to use a
disclaimer to expressly differentiate the two marks was appropriate.171 However,
in E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., the court decided against the use of
such a disclaimer.172 The court felt that based on the findings of a national
survey, such a disclaimer would not be effective in protecting against likelihood
of confusion, and would actually further dilute the plaintiff’s trademark.173 The
court determined that such dilution would constitute irreparable injury and,
therefore, held that the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction.174
Additionally, in Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., the court
denied each party’s motion for summary judgment because under the Polaroid
factors,175 although Levi’s demonstrated strength in its “501” family, factual
disputes existed as to whether it was similar to Jordache’s “Jordache Basics
101” mark.176 In contrast, the Federal Circuit, in Han Beauty, Inc. v. AlbertoCulver Co., was willing to grant summary judgment under the Polaroid
factors.177 In that case, the dispositive factors included “the similarity of the
marks” and “the relatedness of the goods.”178
F. The Family of Marks Doctrine Today
The Federal Circuit defined the family mark as “a group of marks having
a recognizable common characteristic, wherein the marks are composed and
used in such a way that the public associates not only the individual marks, but
the common characteristic of the family, with the trademark owner.”179 When
288 F. Supp. 2d 105, 124 (D.N.H. 2003) (holding plaintiff was entitled to summary
judgment under a claim for infringement against its “Bud” family even though there was
a factual dispute as to the defendant’s intent in using its “Billy Budd” mark).
170
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 1987).
171
Id.
172
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., No. CV-F-86-183, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7950, at *77 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 1989).
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (setting
forth substantially the same test discussed in McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649
F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
176
Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 520–21 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
177
Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
178
Id. at 1336.
179
J & J Snack Foods Corp. v. McDonald’s Corp., 932 F.2d 1460, 1462 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
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the trademark owner has a family of protectable marks that consumers
recognize, courts find that the owner has developed “goodwill” in the protection
of the overall family. 180 There are three clear policy justifications for protecting
such families: (1) the senior user’s interest in being able to enter a related field
at some future time; (2) the senior user’s interest in protecting the good
reputation associated with his mark from the inferior merchandise of the junior
user; and (3) the public’s interest in not being misled by a confusingly similar
mark.181
The doctrine must be asserted within a claim of likelihood of confusion,
under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), and, therefore, cannot be asserted as a stand-alone
claim.182 It may be asserted either to bar registration of a confusingly similar
mark or to assert a claim for trademark infringement.183 In deciding questions of
likelihood of confusion, a court will place itself “in a position of an average
purchaser or prospective purchaser in an attempt to understand what the normal
reaction would be to the marks as they are encountered in the marketplace.”184
An infringing use may be found both in the opposer’s own particular market as
well as outside of the opposer’s market if the likelihood of confusion is
particularly high:
The owner of a mark who has developed a reputation and identity with a
mark through his products, service, marketing, and presence in the market,
has an interest in protecting the business and reputation for which the mark
stands, not only at the present time in the current markets in which he does
business, but for future times and in related markets that the development
of his business might naturally take him. The extent to which he may
protect this interest relates directly to the strength of his mark. While one
mark may not enjoy the strength of identity to preclude use of a junior
mark in a related field or neighboring market, another may enjoy such
recognition that confusion might result outside his own field or beyond the
markets in which he does business. The measurement of this strength is
revealed by evidence demonstrating a likelihood of confusion.185

180

Id. at 1462–63.
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1273 (citing Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports,
Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1976)).
182
Id. at 1274.
183
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2012) (defining trademark infringement as “use . . . [of] any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . likely to
cause confusion”); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining unfair competition as use of “any
word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . likely to cause confusion”).
184
See, e.g., Am. Standard Inc. v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 457, 461
(T.T.A.B. 1978); Peter Mack et al., Choosing Fame Over Family, 37 AKRON. L. REV.
203, 204 (2004).
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Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198, 209–10 (D. Md.
1988) (citations omitted).
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An analysis of the family of marks doctrine today proceeds essentially on
two levels.186 First, the proponent must demonstrate that they are entitled to
protection of a family mark as a result of recurrent use of the common
formative, which is reinforced by consumer recognition.187 Second, the
proponent must show that an opponent’s mark—whether having been registered
or proposed to be registered—presents a likelihood that an ordinary consumer
who encountered it could reasonably believe that it originated from or was
sponsored by the proponent.188
1. Proving Ownership of a Family Mark
Under the first level of the analysis, the proponent must provide evidence
of prior registrations or use of a number of marks that share a common
characteristic or formative.189 In Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs., Inc., the
proponent provided evidence of the registration of six marks with “‘GOLDEN’”
in the title, which the court found was enough to entitle the proponent to
protection.190 In Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., Aloe Crème Labs.
provided evidence of registration or prior use of over eighteen marks that used
the “ALO” formative.191 McDonald’s provided evidence of over fifteen different
registrations of “Mc” or “Mac.” E. & J. Gallo Winery listed only four
registrations in their complaint but provided evidence of over ten total
registrations of “Gallo.”192
After showing that the proponent has a number of marks that all share a
common element or formative, the proponent must show that the family mark is
sufficiently distinct to warrant protection.193 The formative must not be the final
syllable of common words or be a generic term for the underlying product.194
Courts will analyze the distinctiveness of the proponent’s family mark by

186

See Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs., Inc., 317 F.2d 397, 400 (C.C.P.A. 1963);
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1272.
187
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1272; see also Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99,
Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316, 1975 TTAB LEXIS 114, at *34–35 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 29,
1975).
188
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274–79.
189
See Motorola, 317 F.2d at 498.
190
Id.
191
Aloe 99, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA), 1975 TTAB LEXIS, at *11–13.
192
E. & J. Gallo Winery, v. Gallo Cattle Co., No. CV-F-86-183, 1989 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7950, at *10 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 1989).
193
See Burroughs, Wellcome & Co. v. Mezger Pharmacal Co., 228 F.2d 243, 244
(C.C.P.A. 1955).
194
Id.; see also Lauritzen, & Co. v. Borden Co., 239 F.2d 405, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1956);
Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 59 (9th Cir. 1962).
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placing it somewhere on Judge Friendly’s Abercrombie spectrum.195 Fanciful or
arbitrary marks are invented solely for their use as trademarks and are entitled to
protection without the proponent’s demonstration of secondary meaning.196
Suggestive marks require imagination, thought or perception to reach the nature
of the goods and are entitled to protection without proof of secondary meaning
as well.197 Descriptive marks, in contrast, convey an immediate idea of the
ingredients, qualities or characteristics of the goods; they may be entitled to
protection only after the proponent has demonstrated secondary meaning.198
Generic marks either refer or have come to refer to the type of product sold, and
are generally not entitled to protection.199 Where the family mark is found
descriptive, it may still be entitled to protection if the proponent provides
evidence that the mark has gained secondary meaning in the marketplace.200
In conjunction with demonstrating the existence of the common formative
and establishing its distinctiveness, the proponent must also prove that such
prior registration or use is not recent or insignificant.201 Courts generally look to
four factors to determine the extensiveness of the proponent’s use and to
measure consumer recognition (this is substantially the same inquiry a court
makes in analyzing whether the proponent has created secondary meaning202):
(1) the substantiality of business through which the family is marketed; (2) the
value of the products sold within the family; (3) the period of time over which
the proponent has marketed the family; and (4) whether the proponent is well
established in the industry at the time of the defendant’s entry. 203 The more the
proponent spends on advertising for an extended period, and the greater the
indication of actual consumer recognition of the family, the more likely the
court will be to protect the proponent’s family.204
Finally under the first level of analysis, the proponent must avoid
ancillary considerations such as numerous third party registrations of the
formative in the pertinent industry or the possibility that the defendant’s mark is
different enough from the proponent’s so that the court does not proceed to an
195

See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir.
1976).
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
See Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Milsan, Inc., 423 F.2d 845, 848 (5th Cir. 1970)
(granting protection to a generic mark risks entitling the mark owner to a monopoly in the
product).
200
See Aloe Crème Labs., Inc. v. Aloe 99, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316, 1975 TTAB
LEXIS 114, at *31–32 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 1975).
201
See Creamette Co. v. Merlino, 299 F.2d 55, 58 (9th Cir. 1962).
202
See generally Aloe 99, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA), 1975 TTAB LEXIS 114.
203
See Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs., Inc., 317 F.2d 397, 399 (C.C.P.A. 1963); see
also McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1272.
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analysis of the likelihood of confusion.205 Mere third party registrations alone,
however, will not be enough to bar protection of the family. 206 For third party
registrations to matter and potentially bar protection, they must be registered and
actually used in more than an insignificant way by the proponent’s competitors;
additionally, there must be actual consumer recognition of such third party
registrations.207
2. Demonstrating a Likelihood of Confusion
Under the second level of analysis and after having demonstrated a
protectable family mark, the proponent must then demonstrate that the
defendant’s mark presents a likelihood of confusion.208 Whereas the first level of
analysis focuses on the proponent’s mark alone and the corresponding business
and consumer recognition supporting it, the second level of analysis explicitly
compares the proponent’s family to the defendant’s mark.209 The factors the
court weighs in the second level of analysis are the factors expressed by the
Southern District of New York in McDonald’s: (1) the strength of the owner’s
mark; (2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the
products; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will expand; (5) evidence of
actual consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant adopted their mark in
good faith; (7) the relative quality of the products; (8) the sophistication of the
buyers; and (9) the relative harm to the parties should the court grant or deny the
relief requested.210

II. HOW THE FAMILY OF MARKS DOCTRINE BENEFITS APPLE
Applying the foregoing case law to three hypotheticals will demonstrate
more clearly how Apple may use the doctrine. The succeeding hypotheticals are
fictitious and range from situations in which a court is least likely to find a
likelihood of confusion to those in which a court is most likely. Although these
examples are fictitious, real world examples exist of companies using the “i”
prefix to directly or indirectly benefit from the goodwill Apple has created in the
“i” mark including: iHome’s consumer electronic products211 and BMW’s
concept car series including iDrive i8 and i3 cars.212 Important questions of legal
205

See Polaroid v. Richard Mfg. Co., 341 F.2d 150, 152 (C.C.P.A. 1965); see also
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Winter Seal Corp., 291 F.2d 945, 946 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
206
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274.
207
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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iHOME, http://www.ihomeaudio.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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I,
BMW,
http://www.bmwusa.com/standard/content/vehicles/2014/
bmwi/bmwi.aspx#home (last visited Nov. 22, 2013).
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strategy remain for Apple in the wake of increasing commercial use of the “i”
prefix among larger and more powerful companies such as BMW. While
BMW’s actual use of the prefix remains deferred because it is being applied to a
line of future concept cars that have yet to be brought to market, such emerging
uses threaten to dilute consumer association with Apple’s ownership and use. If
Apple were to fail to vigorously defend its right to use the prefix, contrasting
with McDonald’s active use of the doctrine in the 1980s and 90s, Apple will
passively accept such potentially infringing commercial uses. This strategy may
inhibit any future attempts Apple may take to protect its family. Therefore, to
protect the providence of its brand, Apple should take a more active role in
policing its line of “i” products by resorting to the family of marks doctrine.
The following chart provides information demonstrating Apple’s
dominance in the tech market and establishes that Apple has a market position in
the consumer technology industry similar to that of McDonald’s in the late
1980s and early 1990s in the fast food industry. Apple’s yearly revenue and
yearly advertising expenses are directly relevant in proving to a court that it has
demonstrable goodwill in the “i” family prefix.

Year
1998
1999
1999

APPLE’S MARKET GROWTH (1998-2012)213
General
Apple Product
Advertising
Introduced
Expenditure
Revenue
iMac
$5,941 million
iMovie
$6,134 million
iPhoto (iLife Suite)
$6,134 million

2000214
2001
2003
2007

iPod
iTunes
iPhone

$467 million

$5,363 million
$6,207 million
$24,578 million

2010
2011
2012

iPad
iCloud
iBooks Textbooks

$691 million
$933 million
$1 billion

$65,225 million
$108 billion
$156 billion

To put these numbers in the context of a possible family marks argument
for Apple, McDonald’s had sixteen “Mc” or “Mac” trademarks at the time of its
litigation with McBagels.215 As of 2013, Apple has at least twenty trademarks
213
Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc. (last visited Nov.
20, 2013).
214
No data found for the year 2000.
215
McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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bearing the “i” mark (including second and third generation versions).216
McDonald’s ran around 100 national and local TV commercials in 1986 and
also ran ads in print advertising and in national magazines.217 Between 2006 and
2009, Apple ran a highly successful national TV commercial campaign entitled
“Get a Mac,” in which two actors used the memorable lines, “I’m a Mac” and
“I’m a PC,” in effort to personify the relative styles between Macs and PCs, as
well as between Mac and PC users.218 With this ad campaign alone, Apple ran
over sixty ads in the United States, thirty-two ads over the internet, fifteen ads in
the United Kingdom, and twelve ads in Japan.219 Media analysts characterize the
“Get a Mac” campaign as “effective” because one month after its release
200,000 more Macs were sold, with an overall increase in the number of Macs
sold in the first year of the campaign of 39%.220 In addition to the spike in Mac
sales, there are other indicia of the ad campaign’s effect on the culture and
corresponding consumer recognition as it was criticized in third party
periodicals and parodied both on national television and on the internet.221
Additionally, whereas McDonald’s had used its “Mc” mark for ten years at the
time of its suit, Apple has currently used the “i” mark for fifteen years.222
Finally, whereas McDonald’s spent between $350 and $400 million in
advertising in 1986 with corresponding revenues of between $2.5 and $3 billion,
Apple spent roughly $1 billion in advertising in 2012 with corresponding
revenues of $156 billion.223 All of Apple’s astronomical numbers suggest
consumer recognition at least on par with, and likely drastically exceeding,
McDonald’s circa 1986. The one factor that McDonald’s had in its favor going
into its litigation with McBagels that Apple will not have in any near litigation is
the fact that McDonald’s was active in policing its “Mc” marks.224 In order to
fully place itself in a position akin to McDonald’s, Apple should consider
becoming more active in protecting its mark.

216

Timeline of Apple, Inc. Products, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
/Timeline_of_Apple_Inc._products (last visited Jan. 12, 2014).
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A. Hypothetical #1: iBoat
A new boating company, Shanghai Pirates, has just come out with a
revolutionary concept for a boat that borrows from the simplicity and sleekness
of modern design and technology. 225 The hull is reinforced titanium and the top
deck is a mixture of organic wood and metal. It has a complex internal computer
that provides GPS navigation on the water and can auto pilot the boat in case of
leisure or emergency. It also boasts its ability to connect to the internet
anywhere on the sea so that travelers will never be out of contact with the
mainland, and the internet connection provides a direct link to communication
sites in case the pilot of the ship needs to send a message for help. Designers
were thinking of calling the boat “Titanic part deux,” but instead settled on
iBoat. While the boat has been in the planning stages for a while, the company
did not immediately register the trademark and instead waited until the debut of
the prototype in June 2012. When the company introduced the boat to the
market and began vigorously advertising it, Apple, Inc. brought suit for
trademark infringement asserting a family of marks claim under likelihood of
confusion. Shanghai Pirates had already taken out ads in major newspapers such
as the New York Times and print publications such as Time, Newsweek, and
Vogue. Shanghai Pirates had also advertised on billboards, in boating stores and
showrooms, and on the radio. Apple conducted an independent national survey
that found four out of ten people surveyed asked if Apple had gone into boating.
Apple also gained evidence from the depositions of boating showroom owners
that customers had called inquiring about the boat and asked if Apple was
associated with it. Shanghai Pirates received notice of the litigation and, having
already spent a large amount on advertising the boat, decided to continue to
advertise it under the “iBoat” trademark. What should the court’s result be given
the foregoing case law and analysis?
The court will proceed to analyze Apple’s claim of trademark
infringement against Shanghai by first determining whether Apple owns a
family mark in the “i” prefix and then determining whether Shanghai’s mark
presents a likelihood of consumer confusion. Under the first level of analysis
Apple must show: (1) that it has a number of prior registrations or uses of “i”
marks such that it is possible that the public recognizes the “i” family; (2) that
its family mark is distinctive enough to warrant protection; (3) that its use of the
family has been substantial resulting in consumer recognition; and (4) that the
defendant’s mark is similar enough to Apple’s to proceed to a likelihood of
confusion analysis, and Apple must show that there are not numerous third party
registrations suggesting a bar on protection.226
225
But see Cruising Boats, IBOAT TRACK, http://iboattrack.com/cruising.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2012).
226
See Motorola, Inc. v. Griffiths Elecs., Inc., 317 F.2d 397, 398 (C.C.P.A. 1963);
McDonald’s, 649 F. Supp. at 1274.
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Apple will likely be able to satisfy the first element because its number of
“i” products is enough to qualify for family protection. Courts have accepted
that a company has established a family with evidence of as few as six
registrations with a common formative.227 Apple has twenty-six registered marks
bearing the “i” prefix.228 This would place Apple in a similar category to
McDonald’s, who had over twenty registrations of the “Mc” or “Mac” prefix at
the time of its litigation with McBagels.229
Under the second element, Apple may have a more difficult time arguing
for the distinctiveness of its family. The court will address the distinctiveness of
Apple’s “i” prefix family by placing it somewhere on Judge Friendly’s spectrum
of trademark distinctiveness: arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, or
generic.230 Because most of Apple’s “i” products involve computer technology
equipment, which has a high association to the internet, it is arguable whether
the “i” prefix is descriptive for use on the internet. If this is true, Shanghai could
argue that the “i” mark is not entitled to protection, because, under Judge
Friendly’s test, the “i” mark conveys an immediate idea of the ingredients,
qualities, or characteristics of the goods.231 Apple may counter, however, that it
is not necessarily the case that the “i” prefix is meant to denote use on the
internet. Its initial iPod format was simply a media player that played mp3 files
and did not have free access to the internet. That product was one of Apple’s
first with the “i” prefix and was not linked necessarily to the internet and was
also a tremendous success.232 Other products such as iLife and iDVD pertain to
computer applications or software and also do not have an immediate relation to
the internet. Thus, Apple may argue that the “i” family mark is suggestive
because it requires imagination, thought or perception to reach the nature of the
goods from reading the “i” prefix in conjunction with the rest of the mark.233
However, whether the “i” family is suggestive or descriptive under Judge
Friendly’s test may not ultimately matter in a full analysis of the family mark’s
distinctiveness. Even when a family mark is descriptive it may be entitled to

227
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protection if the proponent demonstrates secondary meaning in the mark.234
Courts address substantially the same factors to determine secondary meaning as
they do in determining consumer recognition for purposes of family mark
protection.235 This is to say that, even if Apple’s “i” family is found to be
descriptive, Apple has likely achieved secondary meaning in the marketplace
and, therefore, qualifies for protection of its family of “i” marks.
Under the third element, Apple will be able to demonstrate that its use of
the “i” family has been substantial, and, therefore, there is measurable consumer
recognition of the mark. Courts look to four factors to determine substantiality
of use: (1) the amount of business through which the family is marketed; (2) the
value of the products sold under the family mark; (3) the period of time over
which the proponent has marketed the family; and (4) whether the proponent is
well established in the industry at the time of the defendant’s entry.236
Under the first factor, Apple does a considerable amount of business
under its “i” related products. In weighing the amount of business done under
the family mark, courts look to the number of distributors, retailers, and service
organizations that handle the goods.237 In the Motorola case, the court found that
Motorola “sells through 98 distributors who sell, in turn, to more than 23,000
retailers and about 25,000 service and repair organizations,” and concluded that
those figures support a finding of substantial business done under the family. 238
In McDonald’s, 9,000 restaurants suggested substantial business.239 Apple has
nearly 400 Apple Stores in 14 different countries, over 250 of which are in the
United States.240 In addition, there are thousands of authorized Apple retailers
worldwide, including Verizon, Sprint, Best Buy, and Target. Therefore, under
the Motorola and McDonald’s standards, Apple conducts a sufficient amount of
business under the family mark.
Under the second factor, the value of the products sold under Apple’s “i”
family is great. In Motorola and McDonald’s, revenues of $230 million and $2.5
billion, respectively, supported family protection.241 Apple has sold over 300
million iPods since its launch ten years ago, with a corresponding 78% market
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share in the music market.242 While Apple has lost market share to Google’s
Android phones, the iPhone is still at a 33.4% market share in the cell phone
industry.243 This suggests that one out of three cell phones sold is an iPhone. Its
iPad market share has “slipped” to 50%, as it has only shipped a measly 14
million iPads worldwide from July to September of this year.244 This would
suggest that Apple ships roughly 50 million iPads per year. For the 2011 fiscal
year, Apple reported revenue of $108.25 billion and net profit of $14.01
billion.245 Apple’s main “i” products—iPod, iPhone, iPad, and iTunes—
accounted for 75% of its revenue, or roughly $10.5 billion in net profits.246 The
value of only four of Apple’s twenty-six “i” products was, in 2011, five times
that of the amount of McDonald’s’ revenue that supported family protection
when McDonald’s sued to enforce its family mark against McBagel’s.
Therefore, the value of Apple’s “i” products weighs in favor of protecting the
family.
The third factor, the length of time over which Apple has promoted its
family, also weighs in favor of family protection. In Motorola, the plaintiff’s
first registration of a mark with the “GOLDEN” formative was in 1935, it
registered subsequent marks in 1947, 1948, 1955, 1956, and 1957, and it
brought suit in 1963. McDonald’s first began using the “McMuffin” mark in
1968 and the “McNuggets” mark in 1979, it initially began using the
“McDonald’s” mark in the late 1950s, and it brought suit in 1986.247 Apple
launched its first “i” product in 1998 with the iMac G3.248 It launched its iBook
product the following year and the first generation iPod in 2001.249 Apple has
been vigorously marketing its “i” family of products since 1998 and has steadily
242
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created consumer recognition in the mark over the last fifteen years. This is a
similar amount of time to the roughly twenty years over which McDonald’s
created its family at the time of its lawsuit against McBagel’s. Therefore,
because the fifteen-year period over which Apple has created and developed its
“i” family mark is substantial, this factor weighs in favor of family protection.
Under the fourth factor, Apple is well-established in the technology
industry at the time of Shanghai’s entry. Courts look to the extent of the
proponent’s advertising, as well as evidence indicating consumer recognition of
the family to determine the extent to which the proponent is established.250 In
Motorola, the proponent spent $12 million in advertising over a period of
roughly twenty years.251 In McDonald’s, McDonald’s and its licensees spent
over $300 million in advertising (national and local television, radio, newspaper,
magazine, billboard, etc.) in 1984 and $350 million in 1985.252 Additionally,
there were indications of consumer recognition outside McDonald’s advertising
in the form of independently-created articles and stories in the media.253 Such
independent articles that focused on the formative itself implied a deep
awareness in the culture of the derivation of the mark. Surpassing McDonald’s’
advertising and marketing expenditures, Apple has spent well over $300 million
in advertising in recent years.254 It spent $467 million in 2007, $691 million in
2010, and $933 million in 2011.255 These numbers far exceed the $350 million
McDonald’s spent on advertising in 1985, which was persuasive to the court in
finding that McDonald’s had a protectable family mark. Additionally, Apple
may provide numerous independent news sources focusing on its “i” products
and its “i” mark in particular. Examples include: “16 Wacky Apple Products
You Can Only Imagine.”256 “Apple’s Next Product,”257 and “Jobs Says Apple’s
250
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“i” Products Score.”258 These news articles, and the many others like them,
derive meaning because the public recognizes Apple’s “i” prefix. Therefore,
both Apple’s extremely high expenditures in advertising and the evidence of
independent news articles suggesting public awareness of the “i” mark
demonstrates that Apple’s mark is well-established in the market. Because all
four factors of the third element weigh in favor of finding that Apple’s use of the
family has been substantial, Apple will demonstrate consumer recognition.
Under the fourth element, Apple may run into difficulty. While a
company may demonstrate entitlement to family protection, the defendant may
argue that the existence of many third party registrations suggests that the
proponent is not entitled to enforce the family mark.259 Third party registrations,
however, must be actually used by competitors, and there must be some
evidence of consumer recognition in the competitor’s mark to weaken the
proponent’s protection.260 With respect to Apple, there are third party
registrations or uses in the technology industry of “i” products.261 For example,
iHome markets speakers in the technology industry under that mark, and iHome
is not an Apple product. There are other examples that reinforce this argument,
such as Sony’s software registration using the “i” prefix.262 However, Apple has
a strong counter to this argument. Although third party registrations do exist,
Apple may argue that they are either promoted by non-competitors or not
actually used. In the case of Sony, that company no longer actively markets its
“i” software. In the case of iHome, that company cannot really be considered a
competitor of Apple’s because its goods are meant to be compatible and are
used for non-competing purposes. Additionally, Apple and iHome exist at two
very different ends of the technology market and, while they may appeal to a
similar consumer, they do so for different reasons. Apple appeals because of the
quality of its goods and because of the strength of its brand, whereas iHome
appeals because its products are cheap, may be used in conjunction with Apple
products, and because iHome derives a certain goodwill from the “i” mark that
Apple made successful. Therefore, because such registrations cannot be said to
be marketed by Apple competitors, a court will likely look beyond these
258
Matt Berger, Jobs Says Apple’s “i” Products Score, PC WORLD (Jan. 7, 2002, 1:00
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examples in protecting Apple’s family. Additionally, because of the simplicity
of the “i” formative, a court is likely to find any subsequent company’s use of
the “i” prefix to be similar enough to Apple’s to proceed to an analysis of the
likelihood of confusion. As Learned Hand pointed out, just because a potential
infringer uses its mark in a different market does not mean it is shielded from an
action for infringement.263
An argument may be made that, because the “i” prefix has become so
pervasive, both in the culture and in the market, Apple cannot enforce the “i”
prefix as a family mark because it has entered into the cultural property of our
society.264 Shanghai would have to argue that the use of the “i” prefix for all
things internet-related has become ubiquitous in the culture such that the mark
has become synonymous with an internet good. Using the holding in Merlino,
Shanghai would have to argue that the “i” prefix has become as ubiquitous as
the use of the “ettes” suffix for diminutives.265 There is some support for this
argument in our culture.266 Practically every type of good you can think of is
being marketed somewhere under the “i” prefix in attempt to usurp some of the
mark’s goodwill. However, this argument is ultimately harder to prove than
third party registrations because it forces the judge to make an estimation as to
the ubiquity of the use of the mark. While the “i” mark is tremendously popular
right now, that popularity may have little to do with the fact that the mark is
somehow cultural property, as is the French diminutive “ettes,” and more to do
with the fantastic success of the mark due to Apple’s efforts in creating
consumer recognition. Ultimately, this type of argument must be addressed from
the standpoint of causation. Is the original user using a mark, or part of a mark,
that has already been widely used in the culture before the use in
questionsimilarly to the presence of “ettes” in the culture before Creamettes
sought to enforce its family based on that suffix. If, instead, the mark was not
widely used and the popularity of use can only reasonably be determined as
deriving from the original user’s secondary meaning and goodwill, then the
judge should enforce a family of marks argument. The popularity of the mark
that a company has legitimately created based upon that company’s market
success is exactly the intellectual property that the family of marks doctrine is
meant to protect. Here, it seems as though the popularity of the “i” prefix derives
from Apple’s efforts at making the “i” prefix popular and not from any preexisting popularity in the culture. Therefore, courts should recognize the
263
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significant efforts Apple has made to develop the popularity of its marks and the
corresponding consumer recognition achieved, and should protect Apple’s use.
Because a court will likely find that Apple has a protectable family mark,
it will then proceed to the second level of analysis, which is to determine
whether Shanghai’s “iBoat” presents a likelihood of confusion. To do so, the
court will weigh the McDonald’s factors: (1) the strength of the owner’s mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the marks; (3) the proximity of the products;
(4) the likelihood that the prior owner will expand; (5) evidence of actual
consumer confusion; (6) whether the defendant adopted their mark in good faith;
(7) the relative quality of the products; (8) the sophistication of the buyers; and
(9) the relative harm to the parties should the court grant or deny the relief
requested.267
The strength of Apple’s mark favors a finding of a likelihood of
confusion. Strength is “a function of its distinctiveness, or its tendency to
identify the goods or services sold under the mark with a particular source.”268
Courts measure strength both in terms of the mark’s distinctiveness on Judge
Friendly’s spectrum and in terms of whether the mark has gained distinctiveness
through the proponent’s marketing efforts or promotion.269 McDonald’s’
“massive” advertising efforts enhanced the distinctiveness of its “Mc” family. 270
Here, Apple’s mark, as stated above, is likely either suggestive or descriptive,
using Friendly’s definitions. If the mark is suggestive it is considered distinctive
and strong without Apple’s showing that it has gained secondary meaning. So, if
the court finds that the “i” mark is suggestive, this alone would result in a
finding that it is strong. But even if the court finds the “i” mark descriptive,
Apple’s massive $900 million advertising campaign in 2011 to promote its
products places it in that upper echelon of companies whose efforts directly
translate into consumer recognition. Also, the independent media articles
referencing Apple’s “i” mark suggest that Apple’s promotion has become
successful and that its “i” family mark is known. Therefore, regardless of
whether Apple’s “i” family is found to be suggestive or descriptive, Apple has
created enough secondary meaning in the “i” mark to warrant a finding that the
mark is strong. Shanghai may point to the ubiquity of use of the mark among
third parties to argue under Merlino that such a mark that has entered the
cultural lexicon is not strong within the meaning of the McDonald’s factors. But
to the extent that such an argument assumes the popularity created in the mark
as being already present in the culture, it denies the reality that such popularity
is the result of Apple’s efforts. Therefore, Apple’s use and success under the
mark should be respected and the goodwill surrounding the mark should be
considered Apple’s property.
267
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The similarity of Apple’s and Shanghai’s marks also favors a finding of
confusion. Similarity is a function of whether the marks are similar in isolation
and whether the advertising of the marks does nothing to distinguish that
similarity.271 The court in McDonald’s found McBagel’s’ mark similar to the
McDonald’s mark in isolation and found that the way the defendant advertised
its restaurant and bagels in newspapers, on the radio, and at the restaurant itself,
enhanced the similarities between the companies.272 The offending mark
featured prominently in all three mediums and nothing printed eliminated the
possibility that McDonald’s sponsored the defendant’s business.273 Here,
Apple’s family mark is the “i” prefix, which is then applied to a specific product
(usually technological). Shanghai’s mark is also the “i” prefix, which it attaches
to the word “boat.” Although Apple has not marketed boats before, the fact that
this boat is also highly technological increases the similarity between the marks.
Additionally, Shanghai advertised its mark nationally in high profile
publications that are the same publications Apple has used to market its goods;
Shanghai also did nothing to distinguish their mark or goods from Apple’s
family of “i” marks in their advertisements. Such advertisements will also reach
a similar cross section of the public—the cross section who reads such
publications and who is influenced by such advertising—which further suggests
the similarity of the marks. Therefore, the court will likely find the marks
similar.
The proximity of the products may actually hurt Apple, however.
Proximity is determined by whether the parties’ industries are similar enough to
suggest that a consumer could reasonably believe they come from the same
commercial source.274 McDonald’s products were found proximate to
McBagel’s because both offered restaurant industry services—hamburgers and
bagels, respectively. 275 Apple’s products may generally be characterized as
technology goods, but more specifically would fall under computers and digital
media.276 Shanghai ostensibly makes boats. Apple would want to point to the
similarities between the products and avoid general differences. It could do so
by arguing that what makes iBoat unique is its emphasis on technological
innovation and its strong computer network, both of which are attributes that
Apple products share. Thus, Shanghai’s product is not just a boat, but a highly
advanced piece of technological equipment that just so happens to operate on
water. The question would be: are Apple’s products to “iBoat” what a
271
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hamburger fast food restaurant is to a bagel shop? The fact that the relative
industries are very different likely suggests that the products are less than
proximate. However, the “zone of protection may reach into the area of
noncompeting goods . . . [and] extends to products . . . reasonably thought to
originate from the same source.”277 This factor, therefore, appears neutral.
The likelihood of expansion may work against Apple. A court measures
the likelihood of expansion by determining whether there is substantial
probative evidence that suggests the senior user may sell a similar product to the
junior user’s in the future.278 In McDonald’s, “substantial probative evidence”
demonstrated that McDonald’s had an ongoing program to test new products,
and that it tested bagels under this program.279 Although Apple is a highly
innovative company and likely has many ongoing programs to test new
products, it has shown no signs of entering the transportation industry whether
on land or on water. Apple may argue that because of its size and financial
strength, no industry involving advanced technology is beyond its grasp. But the
court will likely be more modest in providing scope to Apple’s protection; the
court frowns on giving “boundless monopolies” even to such titans of industry
as McDonald’s or Apple.280 Therefore, because Apple has not shown any
interest in entering the transportation industry, it will likely fail to show a
likelihood of expansion into the boating market.
On the facts presented, Apple will be able to provide evidence of actual
confusion. A court measures actual confusion in two ways: evidence of actual
instances where consumers have been mistaken in the marketplace or survey
evidence demonstrating that an objective subset of the consumer population
would likely be confused by the similarity of the marks.281 Evidence of actual
confusion is not essential to prove confusion, but it is highly persuasive. 282
McDonald’s demonstrated actual confusion by providing evidence that one of its
managers received several inquiries concerning whether McDonald’s was going
into the bagel business. McDonald’s also provided national and local survey
evidence indicating confusion.283 Here, Apple may point to evidence
demonstrating actual confusion. Apple has national and local survey evidence
demonstrating that a substantial portion of the consumer population was
mistaken by the marks. It also has the evidence of the boating showroom
managers who testified that customers had inquired as to whether the iBoat was
associated with Apple. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of confusion.
277
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Shanghai’s use of the “i” mark appears to have been made in less than
good faith. A court measures good faith by weighing evidence that the junior
user had either knowledge or awareness of the senior user’s mark before
adopting it for its own.284 The court in McDonald’s found that McBagel’s had
acted in less than good faith because it marketed products using the “Mc”
formative after McDonald’s had filed litigation. Also, McBagels had attempted
to exploit the notoriety of the litigation by referencing it in McBagel’s’
marketing.285 Here, the facts suggest that Shanghai received notice of Apple’s
litigation and still pursued marketing its product under the potentially infringing
mark. Additionally, it is probably impossible for a company in today’s market to
argue a lack of awareness of Apple’s dominant trademarks. Therefore, a court
will likely find that Shanghai has acted with knowledge or awareness of Apple’s
marks and that Shanghai, therefore, acted in bad faith.
The relative quality of the parties’ products “reflects the law’s recognition
that a prior owner should not be subjected to the risk that the public perception
of the product will suffer if it is associated with a product of inferior quality.” 286
Product quality is not an essential element because the proponent is entitled to
protection regardless of the quality of the second user’s product.287 Here, it
appears that both products are of high quality so this factor appears neutral.
The sophistication of the buyers weighs against Apple. Where buyers are
unsophisticated or make their purchasing decisions quickly and casually, the
likelihood of confusion increases.288 The court in McDonald’s found that
consumers in the fast food industry do not make sophisticated restaurant
choices.289 Consumers of high-end technology goods such as personal computers
and digital media make less casual decisions than consumers in fast food.
Because of the high price of an iBoat and the niche consumer whom it would
attract, it is likely that the sophistication of such a consumer is high. It is more
likely that a consumer in these industries would do their due diligence to learn
about the relative products before making a purchase. Therefore, the
sophistication of the buyers weighs in favor of Shanghai.
In weighing the foregoing analysis, a court will likely find that the
strength of Apple’s “i” mark, the similarity of that mark to “iBoat,” the evidence
of actual confusion, and the evidence that the defendant acted in less than good
faith favor a finding of the likelihood of confusion. However, it will likely find a
lack of relatedness of the goods, the absence of a likelihood of expansion, a high
284
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sophistication of the buyers and neutral findings as to relative quality favor a
finding no likelihood of confusion. In HBP, Inc. v. American Marine Holdings,
Inc., the court granted summary judgment to the defendant against the plaintiff’s
likelihood of confusion claim because the plaintiff’s product of car races was
materially different from the defendant’s boats.290 The relatedness of the goods
can be a dispositive factor in the family of marks analysis. 291 The outcome of
this case will be determined by which factors the court chooses as most
important. If the court rewards Apple for the substantial consumer recognition it
has developed and finds persuasive Learned Hand’s argument that protection
may exist across markets, then it may find for Apple. If, however, the court feels
the boating transportation industry is just too different from personal electronics
and that Apple has shown no interest in expansion into the boating market, it
may deny Apple’s claim of infringement. If the court does not find that “iBoat”
presents a likelihood of confusion, Apple may still have a claim for trademark
dilution.
B. Hypothetical #2: iRefrigerator
An upstart technology company decided to switch gears recently from
revolutionizing software to taking on the home appliance industry. The
company’s name is Prophecy, Inc., and it seeks to be the world’s leader in home
appliances. After numerous tries, it has come up with a working prototype for a
new refrigerator. Prophecy’s refrigerator has internal climate settings within the
refrigerator’s computer that allow different areas of the refrigerator to adapt to
the different types of food stored there. The refrigerator’s computer also offers
access to the internet so that temperatures and climates may be controlled
remotely, as well as offering up-to-the-second notice of the refrigerator’s
inventory, so that owners can simply check to see which groceries they need
without having to make a physical list. The refrigerator also gives notices when
certain products are close to expiring, provides health evaluations of the
products stored in the refrigerator, and provides an environment for produce that
simulates nature.
After considering various trademarks for the refrigerator, Prophecy has
come up with “iRefrigerator.” It debuted the product in early 2012 with an
aggressive ad campaign that utilized marketing in newspapers, magazines such
as Vogue, Newsweek and Time, billboards, TV commercials, and radio.
Numerous third party tech blogs have noted that the sleekness of the design
rivals LG and other producers. The iRefrigerator has already been picked up by
major distributors such as Best Buy and Fry’s and has received much consumer
attention and favorable reviews. By mid-2012, Apple filed a lawsuit against
290
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Prophecy alleging that its iRefrigerator mark infringed Apple’s “i” family of
marks. What should the court’s result be given the foregoing analysis?
The first level of analysis shown above for Hypothetical #1 applies
equally to an analysis of whether Apple has a protectable family mark here. The
conclusions of that analysis again were: (1) the business Apple does under the
“i” family is substantial because Apple has over 400 stores worldwide and
thousands of authorized distributors and dealers; (2) the value of the products
marketed under Apple’s “i” family is tremendous because 4 of Apple’s 26 “i”
products account for near 75% of Apple’s $12 billion dollar yearly net revenue;
(3) the period of time over which Apple has marketed the “i” mark is extensive,
lasting roughly 15 years; and (4) Apple’s “i” mark is well established in the
industry with strong corresponding consumer recognition because in 2011 alone
it spent around $900 million in advertising and evidence exists of countless third
party articles referencing the popularity of Apple’s “i” mark. Therefore, because
Apple has a protectable family mark, a court will proceed to determine whether
Prophecy’s “iRefrigerator” presents a likelihood of confusion.
As stated above, Apple’s “i” family is strong as reflected by the amount
of money Apple has invested in advertising and the corresponding consumer
recognition it has gained in the market. The fact that the “i” prefix may be
considered descriptive is of no effect, again, because of the substantial consumer
recognition Apple has achieved with the mark and the secondary meaning it has
created. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of protection. The similarity
between Apple’s “i” family and “iRefrigerator” also favors protection because
both marks use the “i” prefix and both Apple’s “i” family and the iRefrigerator
attempt to be defined by technological excellence and innovation. Also, both
marks are similarly advertised and to similar cross sections of the population.
The similarities between the marks, therefore, favor protection.
Prophecy will likely argue that the products are not proximate because
Apple’s products focus on personal computers and digital media, whereas
Prophecy markets its product in the home appliance market. The similarities
between these industries, however, are far greater than the similarities between
digital media and boats. This is a scenario where Learned Hand’s reasoning in
Yale Electric v. Robertson becomes more persuasive. Additionally, because
other tech companies have successfully branched out in the home appliance
industry—LG and Samsung—this further suggests that it would not be
unreasonable to expect Apple to do so one day. Therefore, while the products
themselves are not particularly proximate, they may be close enough for a court
to overlook their dissimilarities. Moreover, because Apple is such a large tech
company and has so greatly expanded in the last fifteen years, it is foreseeable
that, if they have not done so already, they may have plans or prototypes for
expansions into home appliances. Whereas Apple was once just a computer
company, now, they are world leaders in multi-media formats. Therefore, the
likelihood of expansion into this industry is foreseeable.
Although, no evidence of actual confusion exists on these facts, this
factor is not necessary to a finding of likelihood of confusion. Again, because of
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Apple’s brand strength and widespread consumer recognition, it is almost
impossible to imagine that a company could adopt an “i” trademark in good
faith. A tech company would undoubtedly be aware of Apple’s strong use of the
mark and Apple’s position in the field; therefore, any use of the mark
subsequent to Apple’s dominance cannot be considered to be in good faith. The
relative quality of the goods, as demonstrated in McDonald’s, is not essential to
a finding of confusion and appears a non-factor on these facts. The
sophistication of the buyers here works against Apple because consumers of
Apple products are likely to be well educated and discerning.
Therefore, because a majority of the McDonald’s factors weigh in favor
of a finding of confusion, a court will likely find in Apple’s favor that
Prophecy’s mark is infringing and will proceed to balance the relative harm to
the parties. Here, because Prophecy proceeded to market its iRefrigerator with
full awareness of Apple’s prior use, a court will likely find, similarly to the court
in McDonald’s, that the junior user committed the infringement with awareness
that it could be forced to abandon the mark.
A disclaimer of association as discussed in Gallo would not be
appropriate for the same reasons addressed in that case, mainly because such a
disclaimer would not alleviate consumer confusion and could potentially dilute
the strength of Apple’s family. Therefore, a court will likely grant a full
injunction to Apple.
C. Hypothetical #3: iTV
Recently, an overseas company that had been doing research in the
computer monitor field got an idea. It decided that it would use its knowledge of
flat screen computer monitors to create a line of ultra-modern, ultra-stylish TVs
that incorporate computer technology. The company is called Corsaire, Inc., and
has developed a cult-like status in the electronics business for developing
interesting patents and selling them to major manufacturers who are more able
to develop the ideas. It finally has generated enough capital and has decided to
go into business for itself. It created a prototype for a new TV, which will be a
very narrow flat screen that offers wireless access to the internet and ideal
picture quality. Corsaire is marketing 42-inch, 50-inch, and 64-inch models and
believes the product will be an instant hit. After debating what trademark it
should use, Corsaire settled on “iTV” because it thought that the mark described
perfectly what the TV does and because it believed that, because Apple does not
offer a competing television, Apple’s marks should not apply to them. Corsaire
debuted the product in early 2012 and marketed it to major distributors and in
major publications. Initially, the market was skeptical of the product, but
eventually it caught on. Corsaire gained significant market share when the
product began to be distributed in Costcos throughout the United States. In mid2012, Apple brought a trademark infringement action against Corsaire arguing
that its “iTV” mark was confusingly similar to Apple’s family of “i” products.
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Corsaire stated in various publications that it plans to vigorously fight the
litigation. What should the court’s result be given the foregoing analysis?
Apple will be able to demonstrate that it is entitled to family mark
protection in its “i” mark; therefore, a court will proceed to a likelihood of
confusion analysis. Under this analysis, Apple will be able to demonstrate that
its family mark is strong and that Corsaire’s mark is similar to Apple’s due to:
(1) Apple’s immense consumer recognition in the technology industry, (2) the
similarity in style of the respective marks, and (3) similar marketing channels
used by the companies.
Additionally, Apple has created products that attempt to bridge the gap
between digital media and TV.292 Apple has also speculated on creating a device
extremely similar to Corsaire’s in media sources, and it is likely that Apple has
tested a similar product.293 Therefore, both the proximity of Apple’s products
and the likelihood of its expansion into the TV market favor protection of
Apple’s family mark. In addition, because consumer expectation and a certain
amount of the population already anticipate that Apple’s product will be entitled
“iTV,” there will undoubtedly be examples of actual consumer confusion.294
Because of Apple’s size and power, no tech company using an “i” mark to
seriously market their products could be found to have adopted such a mark in
good faith. Therefore, this factor would weigh against Corsaire. Finally, the
relative quality of the goods and the sophistication of the parties appear to be
non-factors in this analysis. Because six of the eight factors under the likelihood
of confusion favor protecting Apple’s family mark, a court is likely to find that
Corsaire has infringed Apple’s mark. After weighing the relative harm to the
parties and determining that the court cannot mitigate the harm to Corsaire
without diluting Apple’s family, a court should grant Apple a full injunction.

CONCLUSION
While initially of uncertain birth, the family of marks doctrine has grown
to be a viable common law protection within intellectual property law. Debate
may be fruitful concerning whom this doctrine truly benefits—seemingly large
companies with the ability to throw as many products as possible in front of
consumers in order to gain recognition and promotion—as well as whether it is
worth providing additional protection to companies of the stature of a
McDonald’s or Apple, whose products themselves so clearly dominate their
respective markets. However, the doctrine is consistent with providing
292
Apple, Inc., WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple,_Inc#Apple_TV (last
visited Nov. 19, 2013).
293
Michael Comeau, Four Reasons Why iTV Will Be the Easiest Money Apple’s Ever
Made, MINYANVILLE (Oct. 27, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.minyanville.com/
businessmarkets/articles/apple-products-smartphone-iPhone-biographerwalter/10/27/2011/id/37612/.
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protection to the ingenuity of a company’s development and marketing
strategy.295 No greater example of such a strategy can be seen than in the way
Apple has used the spirit behind the family of marks doctrine to promote its
company over the last fifteen years. With the barbarians of the market encircling
Apple’s Tiber, Apple must consider using the shield and sword of the family of
marks doctrine before its “i” mark is lost to history.296

295
It makes sense that, in a nation that rewards innovation with legal protection, a
similar and near absolute protection would be afforded the name under which that
innovation is sold.
296
Alternate ending: In moving forward with its dominance of the technology market,
Apple may likely rely legally on a doctrine that was almost certainly born of market
ingenuity.

